Dense, expensive, litigious, and highly regulated, Manhattan is the quintessential coastal US housing market. Residential construction in Manhattan has fallen relative to total US residential construction over the last 45 years. This time trend has been attributed to tightening local regulation, but is entirely explained away by a combination of the decline of public housing construction and the decreasing national share of construction that is multifamily. Reliance on multifamily housing also helps explain slow construction growth in California and New York State, but not in other Northeast states.
Introduction
Why is Manhattan so expensive? For that matter, why have coastal metropolitan areas gotten so expensive? A prominent explanation relies on the familiar fact that residential development is more heavily regulated in coastal areas than elsewhere.
1 If mobility across metropolitan areas is inelastic with respect to housing prices, then demand growth will lead to greatly increased supply and limited price appreciation in most of the country, but greatly increased prices and limited supply growth on the coasts.
An extension of this argument offered by Glaeser et al. (2005b) is that price appreciation has accelerated in coastal areas because regulation has gotten tighter over time. 
Empirical Analysis
There is no question that Manhattan's share of all US residential construction has fallen over time. The top panel of 4 Joseph Gyourko and Raven Saks generously shared the Manhattan Census data, which they collected by hand.
5 In the authors' words: "there has been a reallocation of property rights over the past 30 years. In the 1960s, landowners were generally free to develop their property in the manner they desired. However, neighbors have become increasingly effective in opposing new construction in more recent decades." Quantifying the plots in Figure 1 , Table 1 reports results from the following regression:
The dependent variable Manhattan Ratio represents the percentage of all US residential building permits issued in Manhattan in columns (1) and (2). In columns (3) and (4), the denominator of Manhattan Ratio is the number of all US residential building permits that were in multifamily buildings with five or more units, but the numerator is still units permitted in Manhattan. β 2 is the estimated effect of the passage of one year on the dependent ratio. Standard errors are Newey West with four lags. Additional regressors X relating to prices are present in columns (5) and (6) and described below.
Column (1) of Table 1 illustrates the point of Glaeser et al. (2005a) seen in the top panel of Figure 1 : building activity in Manhattan has fallen significantly over time relative to construction in the US as a whole. Thus the significant negative coefficient on the Year variable. Because the dependent variable is multiplied by 100, the point estimate of -.017
implies that ten years into the future, we expect Manhattan's share to be .0017 smaller than it is today. Including the number of projects permitted in Manhattan in column (2) reduces the magnitude of that effect by more than half. Likewise, in column (3) we find that there is a large but insignificant effect of time on the ratio of Manhattan permits to all US multifamily permits. However, conditional on the number of permits issued, column (4) shows that there is an insignificantly positive effect of time. Notably, Projects explain more than 75% of the variation in the ratio of Manhattan building permits to all multifamily All US refers to all US private residential building permits. US Mutifamily refers to all US private residential units permitted that were in projects with over 5 units. Projects refers to the number of permits issued to the New York City Housing Authority. Price is the ratio of the OFHEO home price index for the New York metropolitan area to that for the entire US. The dependent ratios are multiplied by 100. Regressions (1) through (4) (5) and (6) start with the OFHEO data in 1976. Newey West standard errors with four lags in parentheses; * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. building permits.
An alternative way to check if there is any time trend in Manhattan's share of all US construction is to maintain the denominator used in columns (1) and (2) Columns (5) and (6) Columns (5) and (6) add the ratio of the OFHEO index for metropolitan New York to the OFHEO index for the entire US as an additional control variable ("Price"). The variable of interest interacts Year with Price; a negative coefficient would indicate that Manhattan's share of construction has become less sensitive to relative price over time. We find instead that the interaction Year×Price has a positive sign both when Manhattan's permits relative to all US permits is the dependent variable (column (5)) and when the dependent variable is Manhattan permits relative to all US multifamily permitting (column (6)). In the latter case, the interaction between relative price and time is significantly larger than zero. There is thus no evidence of declining sensitivity of Manhattan's relative permitting to relative price over time.
The empirical focus in this paper is on Manhattan because Glaeser et al. (2005a) have raised the profile of this case and unearthed a long time series of Census building permit counts for Manhattan. However, Manhattan typically accounts for less than one percent of all US residential Moreover, one might argue as Glaeser et al. (2005a) do, that permitting is becoming more difficult nationally, so that our results for Manhattan might reflect a nationally shared local policy trend against multifamily housing more than the urban renewal and 1980s tax policy changes we describe. However, a slow trend does a very poor job of characterizing the multifamily share series plotted in the bottom panel of Figure 1 . Notably, Regressing the ratio of (permits issued in the later boom)/(permits issued during the eaarlier boom) on the fraction of housing units that were rentals as of 2000 at the state level, we obtain an almost significantly negative coefficient of -.7 (standard error 3.6) on the rental share of housing stock. California has the 7th lowest value for the permitting ratio and New York the 15th lowest out of 50 states. However, their residuals from the regression are only the 21st and 39th most negative, respectively. Thus there is little relative construction shortfall to be explained by regulation in these states over the last two cycles. Even if trends in construction activity cannot be attributed to regulation, the results in this paper do not invalidate the claim of Green et al. (2005) that local regulations cause differences in housing supply levels and elasticities in the cross section of US metropolitan areas.
The role of any such regulatory constraints on supply in rapid coastal price appreciation is also unknown, as shown by Aura and Davidoff (2006) and Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2006) .
A task left to future research is to present or rule out evidence analogous to Figure   1 that particular changes in regulation track changes in relative supply in some coastal markets that are known for intense regulation. Future research might also take more seriously the complexity of the optimal timing of redevelopment, an issue that makes it difficult to attribute any time relationship between price and redevelopment to a cause. The results for
Manhattan seem strong enough to obviate that concern.
